For those interested, the following links will take you to recent interviews (one only yesterday) on Shadow Warfare.  I hope they provide a good feel to the scope of the book, which is indeed broad and has a number of contemporary implications. The military implications tended to come up with Jeff, while the legal, legislative and civics issues were brought up by Matthew.

In regard to the last couple of my posts, as a bit of a prediction, I think we will see Putin move over time to essentially reclaim any and all Russian speaking/Russian cultural enclaves on Russia’s borders. That will give him back some since of “buffering”, it will feed his military industrial complex and his sense of history and to some extent it may restore stability in some of the states that are very much ethnically and culturally at internal odds as they now exist. If its going to stop there, NATO and the western powers best stand up to defend the borders of the populations that don’t prefer to become Russian federation domains.  And, if nothing else, both the diplomats and the businessmen should be bright enough to take the lesson that agreements and pacts with Putin’s Russia are purely “situational”.

One of our own  government’s risks however, is to interpret Russian’s behavior in terms of our own culture and our own military options – we did that back in the earliest days of the Cold War (its called “Mirroring”) and that led to some drastically wrong intelligence estimates on our part – the “bomber gap” being one of them.  But I’m sure somebody took notes…no worries…



About Larry Hancock

Larry Hancock is a leading historian-researcher in the JFK assassination. Co-author with Connie Kritzberg of November Patriots and author of the 2003 research analysis publication titled also Someone Would Have Talked. In addition, Hancock has published several document collections addressing the 112th Army Intelligence Group, John Martino, and Richard Case Nagell. In 2000, Hancock received the prestigious Mary Ferrell New Frontier Award for the contribution of new evidence in the Kennedy assassination case. In 2001, he was also awarded the Mary Ferrell Legacy Award for his contributions of documents released under the JFK Act.

6 responses »

  1. Jim Stubbs says:

    That’s a good one about taking notes, Larry. The late Col. Dave Hackworth, in commets at the end of his remarkable story about his command of an infantry battalion in Viet Nam (Steel My Soldier’s Heart), made a point of talking about the military’s and government’s syndrome that he called CRS (Can’t Remember Sh*t). We have to relearn the lessons made from old mistakes. Arrogance and the old governmental “we’ll cross that bridge when we get to it” play a big part in that, I think.

    • Jim, I think a related issue is that the very senior government officials who end up making the strategic decisions that the “grunts” in the field learn the hard way. I’m currently researching and writing about command and control during crisis and surprise attack situations. One thing that becomes really apparent is that the high level plans are never reality tested; it agonizing to read how the very senior people make mistakes just because they have no relevant experience or context. Perhaps the best example I can think of with JFK during the Cuban missile crisis. JFK had been a “grunt” in field combat and he knew the true reality of how quickly command and control becomes problematic in a crisis. At one point when he was being pressured on a highly complex attack plan involving several services/units, impeccable timing – all to be put into place in a matter of hours with no training – he simply remarked that it was never going to work because “some poor SOB just won’t get the message”. Compare that with a couple of his successors who seem to have thought they could really engage in atomic warfare and control it at discrete levels…amazingly naive.

      • Jim Stubbs says:

        Exactly. It’s why I have long been very wary of the Pentagon. Back in JFK’s day there were battle tested highly competent men there who were victimized by the CRS syndrom, as well as what I believe was over concern with their individual services place in the budget/power structure. Some of their ideas about war stopped reflecting reality, and reflected more their personal concerns for their services and themselves. McMaster’s book about the JCS and JFK’s administration is hard on JFK and his people, but really takes the service chiefs to task for their failures.

  2. Harton Firmin says:

    Yeah well…when it comes to our own military industrial complex we should all worry.

    • I worry about several of our nations commercial complexes, there are others today beyond the military-industrial. But in regard to the MIC, it even more troubling to see how much they are aided and abetted not just by the military but by Congressional agendas. Just take a look at how many cost reductions the military proposes – from base reductions to doing away with entire classes of equipment – and track how often Congress either denies their proposals or forces them to put things back into their budgets because any reduction would effect the Congressman’s state or district. You can always count on the military and their industrial contractors to present reasons to spend money but its pretty sad when you have Congress punish them when they actually try to reduce spending.

      • Jim Stubbs says:

        And what gets lost in the mix is the equipment that troops in combat need and don’t have. The problems with the M4 were/are being handled like the problems with the M-16 when it was first introduced into combat in Viet Nam. The IED proof vehicles that were planned for and should have been built immediately upon our entry into Afghanistan, then Iraq. We were three years into those conflicts with those vehicles still not where they should have been. It took an army battalion comander to out the Pentagon in the press to get those vehicles in country. Three years of IED’s being our biggest casualty producers, and the Pentagon had to be publicly outted to get them in gear. Why? Low cost items, not pie in the sky high tech thingies. Not enough budget clout. Ever read “BOYD”? Well worth the read if you’re interested in the MIC and how stuff gets prioritized. The system of MIC/military weapons planning and procurement is the longest ongoing scandal in our history. I don’t think anything else comes close.

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