Signatures and Profiles – these terms have serious and familiar meanings in criminal investigations, however they are both important in the context of national security – where they have considerably different applications.

In my recent posts I mentioned that the DIA has responsibilities in regard to the national signatures program. In that context signatures are highly technical – as illustrated in the linked description for a missile warnings systems facility which works towards the protection of U.S. Navy aircraft against hostile missile systems.

The same sort of signature work has to be done to address weapons threats to aircraft, ships, space assets and ground forces. As you can imagine the total inventory of weapons/threat signatures is vast and constantly changing.  And in an age of drones, hyper-sonic missiles, and air and sea deployable smart weapons, life is becoming even more complex.  Not only is the maneuverability of unmanned and swarm type drone systems hard to fathom, their ability to violate the previous norms of manned craft in terms of acceleration and deceleration is nothing short of amazing. If you watched the opening of the Winter Olympics and saw the mini-drones form shifting and moving complexes of actual figures, imagine that in terms of hostile action rather than three dimensional real time imaging. But that is only half of the issue.

The other half of the security equation is threat profiling. Even if you can track something, even if you can detect and classify elements of its signature, when do you act against it as a threat? To illustrate that point I’ll give three examples.  First, when the Japanese carrier launched air armada was closing in on Pearl Harbor it was detected by radar, and reported.  The radar was mapping a large swarm of aircraft, moving towards Pearl Harbor…signatures were clear.  But the signature also matched, so some extent, flights of incoming bombers from the American west coast and was not acted on.  And the radar sighting was not “fused” with actual Navy attacks on unidentified submarines that same morning (these days we have warnings “fusion centers” which are supposed to allow us to avoid such mistakes). The military in Hawaii had spent a good bit of time profiling carrier attacks against the island but until all the pieces were put together at the same time the threat was not noted – and then it was far too late.

Another example comes from the Atlanta Olympics, during that event there was extensive security discussion about attacks by hijacked aircraft. The issue of signature and identification was brought up and the issue of aircraft tracking was immediately raised – since the American air defense network had been discontinued, it would all depend on aircraft based transponders and if a transponder was turned off the signature disappeared. The Air Force had profiled and practiced attacks by commercial airliners, but only airliners with operational transponders. Because no threat profile for silenced aircraft was developed, no tactics were developed in response to such a threat – a failure which became dramatically apparent in 2001.

All of which brings me back to the fact that if nothing else, recent revelations have brought us three very interesting real life incidents in which Navy pilots – and in two instances, entire Navy carrier strike groups – have encountered unidentified aerial objects which provide an illustration of what happens when signatures and profiles don’t match anticipated threats. Details of the incidents are still emerging and the extent to which other instances have happened may never become public. What we do know is that in one instance a carrier strike group performing pre-deployment exercises off southern California experienced overflights of unknowns at extremely high altitudes over a period of several days.  The flights involved from three to nine objects, tracked by radar at 80,000 feet and at speeds of ten to one hundred miles an hour. That radar signature doesn’t really match any foreign weapons systems so the tracks were simply treated as anomalies.

But after a few days the objects began to be tracked in descents from eighty thousand feet to twenty thousand feet at speeds, and with G forces, beyond that of any known device (tens of thousands of mph and with G loads of close to 50).  The objects were then radar tracked descending to sea level and moving up and down including simply holding position, motionless.  Again, this profile matches no known threat.

Ultimately, when more objects were detected descending into an area where carrier group air exercises were being conducted extended, the issue was classified as a potential safety hazard and interceptors were dispatched to identify the devices.  What happened at that point is another story indeed, the objects were imaged and recorded in both visual and infrared as well as radar tracked by the interceptors. And absolutely none of the technical signatures or observed performance made any sense. These incidents were indeed transmitted to DIA and pertinent records such as radar scope videos were secured.  Which leaves us with one more, hopefully minor, national security mystery. However given the fact that we don’t appear to possess any weapons systems that could deal with such devices, it would probably be best if they don’t turn out to be a threat. It’s just not good when you have a signature and a profile of what appears to be, at a minimum, ferreting operations by an unknown source – but you literally can’t do anything about it.


5 responses »

  1. Anthony M says:


    Yes, this whole question of signatures and profiles of the strongest UFO / UAP cases is something I am currently looking at quite closely. Whilst I suspect some currently poorly understood natural phenomena (such as those studied by the Hessdalen project, earthquake lights / TSLs and other unusual atmospheric plasmas) may well be part of the overall solution there are some cases / patterns of behaviour which do seem clearly technological (e.g. the USS Gyatt 1964 case is one of relatively few cases that have enough hard data to say it more or less has to have been a technological device but one beyond the capabilities, in terms of range and performance taken together, for a Soviet aircraft operating out of Cuba at that time).

    I’m keeping a general watching brief on this Academy to Stars thing. The information they have put out doesn’t seem sufficient to form a clear assessment of what these FLIR videos are actually showing (at least for me – an expert may be able to say much more of course) and overall I feel a bit uncomfortable with that group at the moment. A lot of money involved and very little indication in terms of what they have put out publically that they have looked at the latest research or have a clear work programme. Hope it all comes together over the next year or two for them, but not forming an opinion on any of that yet…caveat emptor…

    • larryjoe2 says:

      I think that some very definite patterns emerged in the military incidents I study in Unidentified, however a great more can be done by taking another tack and looking at the physical profiles and technical signatures of some well documented daylight observations. Some of the earliest Air Force intelligence collections studies did a good basic job of that and that work can be significantly extended using the radar tracking histories they did not have at the time, as well as the most contemporary visual and infrared imaging. There are clearly some shifts in the types of the physical devices, some differences in those reported by the military, by civilians and specifically in the geographically concentrated mini-waves of different decades.

      I share some of those same concerns – and possibly more – about the To the Stars Academy, which seems more an entertainment/promotional enterprise than anything else. On the other hand the Flir-1 and Gimbel visual and infrared videos tell us a great deal, especially with combined with remarks from the pilots and equally importantly by crew members on the Navy ships involved. Something started going on in the last decade that we haven’t seen since the SAC base incidents of the 1970’s. Interestingly it seems to involve carrier strike groups including Aegis missile cruisers, the only mobile aerospace defense weapons systems currently operational.

      The good news is there is a growing amount of technical data and a number of studies that can be done which sort of got lost along the way, submerged in the vast number of UFO reports of mixed quality, especially the night time observations which consume vast energy with little actual return. As usual, focus is very important and huge numbers don’t in themselves mean all that much.

  2. Anthony M says:

    Yes, a high proportion of the very strongest cases seem related to locations or activities that could be considered strategically significant. It’s hard to say if this is a sampling effect due to better tracking and reporting or a real pattern. It could be ferret type operations or a deliberately ambiguous / deniable message that ‘we are here and you need to factor that in’.

    • larryjoe2 says:

      I think I make a case in Unidentified that it is not a sampling effect, not so much in terms of frequency of incidents but in the actual behavior and activity of the devices themselves over several decades at individual locations. There are definite trends in play, beginning with relatively open, medium to high speed daylight appearances and ending with much more low level, night time incidents. That can be seen at Oak Ridge, Hanford, and Los Alamos, at the Manzano atomic weapons complex, Killeen base and on in time to the SAC atomic bomb depots at air bases and the SAC missile site complexes. More striking is the fact that once the pattern is completed, and the low level incidents occur, that particular site shows no similar repetition and the incidents moved on to another category of site.

      At that point the overall pattern changed and literally was not repeated for over two decades – as far as we can tell – before the whole process started again over large Navy carrier strike groups in both the Pacific and Atlantic. What may be significant is that by that point in time the Cold War American nation wide air defense system, including ground to air missiles, had largely been taken out of service and the Navy carrier groups (with Aegis missile cruise) comprise the only mobile, anti-air and anti-satellite weapons systems operational and deployed (there are a hand full of stationary ICBM interceptors but that is a totally different sort of system, far more limited in terms of targeting options than the Aegis cruisers).

      As to my conclusion in the book…actually its very similar to that in your post.

  3. Anthony M says:

    Thank you. That is a very interesting observation an one I will look at closely.

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