Tipping Point Part 1 – “The Cuba Backstory” – is now live on the Mary Ferrell Foundation: 

https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Tipping_Point_Part1.html

This segment is a pretty large piece of the total material, some of the following segments will be much shorter.  It just comes out this way in trying to maintain some topical unity in dividing it serialization.  I urge those interested to give it a really detailed read, to check out the links and citations and especially to try and follow the chronology as it develops over some five years.

Certainly much of the content has been discussed in bits and pieces, but often without keeping it in proper chronological context.  Given how much people, assignments and agendas changed over that period of time, it is really a mistake not to discuss some of the key names in the conspiracy discussion without placing them in the right time frames (especially since some names appear multiple times, and in very different roles).

I will advise with a blog post whenever a new segment goes up, Part two will likely follow in a week or so.

In the meantime, I will begin to address posts to the question of why some figures who are discussed at length in Someone Would Have Talked to not appear, or appear in a reduced role, in Tipping Point. One of those figures is Richard Case Nagell, who I still consider to be a source with some important information about Lee Oswald, but not information directly related to the attack in Dallas or specifically the details of the specific conspiracy that jelled during October and early November, 1963.

Nagell has some important information to offer about Oswald’s history, going back to Japan, and the interest from various parties which developed in Oswald during 1963. However the overall story of Oswald and the intelligence community is outside the very specific the focus of Tipping Point. Readers of Someone Would Have Talked have already been introduced to Nagell, the 2010 edition introduced the likelihood that Henry Hecksher, someone much more deeply involved in the Cuba story than previously suspected, had been the CIA officer connected to Nagell in Mexico.

In a follow on post I’ll attempt to parse out what Nagell does offer us which is directly related to the context of events in 1963, and what isn’t related to the attack in Dallas.

4 responses »

  1. AnthonyM says:

    Excellent news that this out…
    I shall probably refrain from commenting for a while as I suspect this is going to take some careful reading, cross referencing and consideration.

    I will definitely be purchasing the book form…if your previous works are anything to go by it will probably be the sort of thing we’ll all be referencing back to for many years to come.

  2. larryjoe2 says:

    Hopefully all that is true; I don’t pretend it is not dense material and that there are a great number of source materials to check – including several CIA operational documents that will be new to most people.

    Two things I would still stress, first even though many names will be familiar, what has been glossed over in many discussions is the differences in what people were doing and who they were associating with year by year and month by month. Things changes so much and so rapidly over a three year period that statements made about one point in time can be incorrect or actually inaccurate compared to another. CIA Cuban operations and Cuban exile activities shifted and morphed until in 1963 they were changing dramatically almost month by month.

    Second, we know much more detail about certain Cuban exile activities, both by individuals and groups, than we did even a few years ago…and that ranges from Miami to Chicago to New Orleans and on to Dallas. In certain instances we know so much more about individual actions, about camps, about movements and connections that it clutters up the line of thought in the copy and I was forced to move extensive commentary into end notes….while in truth those details remain quite important. So – don’t think the end notes are just citations and links, lots of new stuff in there if you take a look..(even though end notes are normally the bane of my existence….grin).

  3. John F. Davies says:

    A very thorough analysis.
    Question: When Castro began his activities against Batista I have heard that there was division within the CIA as to whether to support him or not. Some believed that Castro could be manipulated and turned, and that he also received some arms shipments as well. Apparently though, the leadership within the CIA decided to go against Castro and, as covered in your analysis, funded other anti Batista leftist groups.
    Peter Grose, in his biography of Allen Dulles, quotes him as saying; “We must work with the left.” An incredible statement from a CIA director, and makes one wonder about contemporary times, where today’s political left, in their zeal against the current occupant of the White House, have publicly made common cause with an organization that they until recently had condemned in Industrial quantities.

  4. larryjoe2 says:

    Based on some very good Cuban internal histories of the revolution as well as internal U.S. documents I don’t think there was ever any indication of meaningful CIA support for Castro per se. In fact both US military intelligence and CIA intel agents were active in trying to differentiate Castro and/or purely communist revolutionary groups from the more moderate anti-Batista factions. As far as the Eisenhower Administration support for the Batista regime remained strong virtually to the last phase of the revolution.

    Both Administration and CIA opposition were big factors in the considerable difficulties Castro and other revolutionary groups had in getting weapons and ammunition. I’ve read some of the same things you mention but I’ve found no indication of any CIA support for Castro – although they did attempt to set up sources inside his group for intelligence collection. If Gross is correct in his quote, it might simply be an expression of the need to “work with” virtually all groups in terms of establishing contacts to collect intelligence.

    What I can say for sure is there is no sign that it translated into significant shipments of weapons or supplies and what intelligence was obtained was used to interdict gun running, as you see in the very intense efforts of the FBI against McKeown and his group.

    The earliest records of any effort to actually provide supplies (which come out of the Cuba Project records circa 1959) talk about identifying anti-Batista and anti-Castro groups to be supplied – but those plans were overtaken by the success the revolution and the aircraft identified for that project never became operational.

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