JMWAVE Independent Action

I’ve written recently about the extremely unusual July 1963 TILT mission conducted by JMWAVE in support of William Pawley’s effort (organized in conjunction with Senator Eastland’s Senate subcommittee) to obtain information out of Cuba which would have proved a huge embarrassment to the Kennedy administration , very likely undermining the president’s path to reelection. As it turns out, the summer of that same year saw other independent actions by the senior officers at the CIA’s Miami Station.

Based on remarks by William Shackley in interviews with journalist Don Bohning, it appears that Shackley and the Miami station’s chief operations officer got together (around Shackley’s pool) to come up with a plan for renewing covert missions against Cuba and Castro. Normally such plans would have come out of CIA headquarters or at least Desmond Fitzterald’s new Special Affairs Staff – tasked with reinvigorating the anti-Castro effort. Ideally they would actually have originated within the new Cuba Coordinating Committee, a much higher level interdepartmental group which included Robert Kennedy.

At the point in time the committee had just been informed that the Army was conducting its own planning for programs of covert action conducted under Commander in Chief Atlantic (which would have been in line with JFK’s intention to switch major covert action from the CIA to the military, as was already happening in Vietnam).  As it was, JMWAVE appears to have stolen the initiative from both the military and the Cuba Coordinating Committee.

The new JMWAVE effort began with Morales handpicking a very select group of the station’s Cuban paramilitary assets to go into special training for extremely compartmentalized missions – the personnel likely included familiar names from David Boylan and my Wheaton name research, we do know that Tony Izquirerdo was the highly select group. Special high performance boats were obtained, including two “ghost” mother ships which would operate out of Florida ports.

In what would appear to be a direct contradiction to Kennedy administration goal of physically moving mission’s against Cuba offshore, the two ships, Rex and Leda, were based out of Port Everglades and West Palm Beach, flagged as Nicaraguan and captained / crewed by Cuban volunteers. The ships carried radar, electronics and a variety of weapons – stored in port and only mounted at sea. The also carried special high speed boats to be used in the actual sabotage missions. The Rex and Leda were also used to support routine infiltration and caching missions, which continued to average some dozen a month.[i]

Going beyond the missions themselves, Morales utilized his own social network, including contacts in Guatemala, to create a cover for the new sabotage missions – which were conducted by a group designated as Commandoes Mambises. The group was entirely a creation of Morales, using Rafael Martinez Pupo, a wealthy Cuban businessman living in Guatemala, as the public relations front for a group which nobody had ever heard of previously. Pupo became the spokesman for the group, going to the media with reports of their attacks on a metal processing plant and an air raid on a refinery.  Special Group documents do reflect that the covert oversight group was briefed two early raids by Commando Mambisis but it appears a third may also have been conducted using both sea and air assets – the source of the aircraft used is totally undocumented.[ii]

Pupo continued to carry on a media campaign for Commando Mambises, speaking of secret bases in the Caribbean and cells inside Cuba. The September 23 report on two raids to the Special Group was well received, although some security issues were mentioned.

Of course the raids gained a great deal of discussion within the Cuban community, especially given that none of its many leaders or groups had any idea of a group led by Pupo, of anyone who might be fighting with it or of any new bases. Following Special Group security reviews, new missions were authorized for October and November, the first which actually matched a list of raids actually approved by President Kennedy did not occur until October.

The JMWAVE Commando Mambisis missions, operating from Florida, continued through 1963 and on into 1964, even after being exposed to the media in a trap by Castro forces during a mission on October 21. During that mission, infiltration personnel previously inserted into Cuba were identified and monitored by Cuban forces, which then attacked during a pick up effort by the Rex. Two paramilitary personnel were killed, one wounded and four captured. The Rex managed to flee but was tracked back to Florida and as part of the Cuban response, its aircraft mistakenly strafed a U.S. flag bauxite freighter transiting the same coastal waters.

Within days Castro had called out the U.S. involvement, identified the CIA ships and even broadcast the locations of the Florida ports from which they operated.[iii] Reporters flocked to those locations and broadcast extended interviews about the comings and goings of the “ghost ships”.[iv] In something of a fruitless effort, JMWAVE then “sold” the ships through cut outs, repainted and relocated them, while continuing with their missions and giving Castro the opportunity to call out the United States on their follow-on missions which continued under President Johnson.   

In just one more illustration of disconnects within the overall anti-Castro efforts, the Commando Mambisis missions were conducted at the same time that millions of dollars were being poured into the entirely separate and extremely deniable Artime/AMWORLD project, being established at bases around the Caribbean, an effort which did not launch its own boat missions until late spring 1963. While both were ultimately exposed, JMWAVE’s initiative was far more successful in actual raids and damage to Cuban assets.

[i] Cable, JMWAVE to Director, “Infiltrees”,

[ii] Don Bohning, The Castro Obsession, 161-163

[iii] Ibid, 164

[iv] “Castro Says USA used Raider Ship”,  AP Wire Service, October 31, 1963

Wrestling with Mexico City

The official story and timeline for Lee Oswald in Mexico has been found to be rife with anomalies and apparently suppressed information. Even at the time of the HSCA there were enough open questions to assign staff (Lopez and Hardaway) to investigate it. There findings cast even further doubt on the matter. HSCA staff confirmed a number of issues and exposed some significant problems with the CIA’s handling of information about Oswald as well as its suppression of what clearly was an impersonation of Oswald in at least one telephone call.

They also picked up enough information to suggest that Oswald might very well have been in company with suspicious individuals during his visit, even one person who seems to be a perfect match to the individual visiting the Cuban Embassy – which Oswald most definitely was not.

The HSCA Mexico City (the Lopez report) inquiry was withheld for a considerable time but that work is available now and is definitely worth a read:

There are a good number of reasons to believe that issues with Oswald trip to Mexico, his possible meetings with unknown individuals and his impersonation were a critical factor in triggering the suppression of leads suggesting a conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination. That is reflected in suppressed and altered telephone calls between LBJ and FBI Director Hoover as well as the missing notes from a very high level national security meeting on Sunday morning following the assassination…reflected only in a meeting entry describing the subject as relating to Mexico City and the Kennedy assassination.

At this point in time while I remain convinced that Lee Oswald did go to Mexico in the fall of 1963, I’m not satisfied with any part of the official story of his visit there. What I am sure of is that something which occurred there was seminal to the suppression of a full investigation into the assassination and appears to have been more related to a potential confrontation with Russia than Cuba. I’m also not satisfied that JFK research has fully appreciated that there were different agendas in play not only between American intelligence groups but also between the Soviets and Cubans.  At that point in time Fidel Castro remained quite upset with the Soviets over their action in the missile crisis, he was conducting a communist purge within Cuba and was certainly not in lockstep with the Soviets.

Beyond that, Russia and Cuba had competing interests in both Mexico City and Central America.  As I noted in Creating Chaos, Russian political action in Mexico included actually establishing revolutionary groups and taking over the Mexican government. In contrast Cuba was primarily interested in maintaining positive relations with Mexico, both economically and as a point of access to Central and South America.

In light of that, I’ve been fascinated by some new information developed by my friend Carmine Savastano, information which might suggest a Soviet KGB officer was actually involved in the spy games going on around Lee Oswald, possibly even impersonating him. While this is strictly speculative at this point in time, if would explain a number of the anomalies that bother me.  And it would support the assertion by James Hosty that his FBI friends in Mexico City told him that they most definitely did have Oswald under observation there, and had seen him meeting with an individual presumed to be a Soviet agent.  As it turns out Carmine and I hooked up with Chuck Ochelli for a two hour discussion of Mexico City – and the possibility that there was an active Russian connection there, the sort of connection that would certainly explain Johnson’s constant focus on a military confrontation with the Soviet Union rather than with Cuba. If you are interested you can listen to our conversation at:

TILT CIA Independent Action

I’ve written about the TILT action several times so a search should give background on it. And thanks to work by my friend David Boylan, even more details are surfacing, not just on the mission but in regard to the CIA officers who approved it.

What becomes more and more interesting with additional documents is the extent to which the operation was an independent action of the CIA, specifically of its Miami Station.  An action which violated a good number of standard security protocols, utilized Cuban exile personnel unknown to the station – unvetted as per standard practice – and exposed both mission craft and CIA personnel to commercial photography (a LIFE photojournalist) which was neither reviewed nor controlled in any fashion.

The mission itself had originated as a Cuban exile proposal, channeled through various Miami figures (including John Martino) and politicians to the point where it reached a prominent former ambassador and presidential security advisor (William Pawley) as well as a very anti-Kennedy Senator, Julian Sourwine of the Senate Internal Security Committee.

The operation, including Pawley, Martino, four CIA officers, Eduardo Perez (Bayo) and a number of non-operational Cuban exiles involved one of only two CIA “ghost” ships (providing radar overwatch), additonal boats and an aircraft. The mission went well into Cuban territorial waters in order to send in a boat load of heavily armed anti-Castro fighters into Cuba – purportedly to bring out Russian missile technicians with evidence missiles still hidden in Cuba. For those not familiar with TILT, full details of the mission may be found here:

It occurred at a time when all missions into Cuba were to be approved by the covert action committee – Special Group Augmented – and by the president himself. In spite of that it was apparently conducted without informing either, and arrangements were made to provide information from the mission to a Congressional committee and to LIFE magazine – in what would have been a tremendous political blow to the Kennedy administration.

The team sent ashore never communicated nor attempted to recover per the plan. Afterwards both the CIA field officer in charge (Robertson) and the JMWAVE senior operations officer (Morales) prepared memos asserting that they and the CIA itself had been duped by the Cubans.  Interestingly those memos contain detailed information that should have made it rather obvious that something was wrong from the very beginning (primarily a complete lack of interest in plans to recover the group along with the Russian officers).

Equally interesting is a follow up memo from the Miami Chief of Station (Shackley) which suggests the CIA had little to no information on the Cubans being sent on the mission with Pawley and that it had been taken in a “con game” by Bayo and Martino.

Beyond that Shackley himself touts the benefits of the mission regardless of how badly he and more senior CIA officers had been taken – to the point of how much it impressed William Pawley (QDDALE), senior managers at LIFE magazine (perhaps including Henry Luce) as to the difficulties faced by CIA in carrying out Cuban missions – hence minimizing future bad press about the CIA. Shackley was also quite pleased that Senator Sourwine would be impressed by the CIA’s wiliness to take independent action and conduct high risk missions.

While Shackley himself is sometimes touted as being conservative, the TILT mission illustrates his obvious willingness to operate outside the box, for both media and political gain.  Years later he would show the same lack of restraint in Los and Vietnam, authorizing extremely high risk actions with no regard at all for the personnel involved.

Perhaps most importantly, the mission, and Shackley’s rather causal response to all parties being conned, obscures the fact that officers within the Agency were actively violating presidential and special group directives, not to mention acting well outside standard oversight. Shackley’s lack of concern for higher level oversight as well as the fact that there were no repercussions for such independent action could hardly have escaped either Morales or Robertson.

JFK at Risk

As I begin working on the promised monograph about the JFK conspiracy I once again find that virtually all the names in play relating to the attack in Dallas that I find most viable can be traced to Cuban affairs.  Not just Cuba in 1963, but all the way back to 1959 where names like Ruby, McWillie, Ferrie, Sturgis and McKewon first appear in conjunction with the overthrow of Batista and the rise to power of Fidel Castro. Of course those names that would be relatively unknown until after the attack in Dallas year’s later.

Then in 1960, a series of other names appear – names of CIA officers, contract employees and Cuban exile volunteers. Some familiar names from assassination research and other names new to virtually everyone. The following year, in 1961, as a result of the failed Cuba project and the disaster at the Bay of Pigs other names emerge – Bissell, Barnes, Esterline, Morales, Robertson, Harvey and even Angleton.  The degree of hatred for JFK which resulted from that project, and the manner in which he hatred was intentionally orchestrated (not only with the media but to a very focused group of individuals) from Bissell down via Easterline through Robertson and Jenkins to a select group of highly skilled and trained Cuban exiles can only now be fully appreciated.  David Boylan and I have explored that subject in our Wheaton Names research and that research became a critical part of several chapters in my new book – In Denial.

And in 1963 a handful of those individuals can be shown to have become privy to JFK’s decision to conduct back channel contacts and a potential settlement with Fidel Castro, pursuing what could be gained for the United States in moving Castro’s Cuba into a position of international neutrality. That initiative was highly secret and highly dangerous, RFK himself warned his brother it could lead to his impeachment. Yet it was compromised and communicated not only at the highest levels of the CIA but downwards to the CIA station in Miami and on to a series of Cuban exiles and fellow travelers – reaching as far as John Martino. There is little doubt that knowledge placed JFK at risk, and no doubt at all that he and his brother realized it – resulting in RFK’s immediate suspicion of CIA officer and Cuban exile involvement on the afternoon of the attack in Dallas.

However, at the highest level, while Cuba may have proved to be the trigger, it’s critical to remember that people at the highest levels of the Special Group, as well as in the CIA, were coming to understand – and fear – that Kennedy was far more dangerous to the established Cold War paradigms than simply in regard to Castro and Cuba. By 1963 JFK was in the process of breaking from the Truman/Eisenhower Cold War practices around the globe. Those practices had been based in the view that that nations had to choose sides; they were either with the Western Bloc or the Eastern Bloc.

That world view was even codified in the SIOP nuclear war plan that if the nation went to war, atomic strikes would be launched against not just Russia but against every nation considered part of the Eastern Bloc, including China. Kennedy came face to face with that reality during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, only then realizing how limited his strategic options were.

Kennedy was the first American president with the background to appreciate that the forces of nationalism and anti-colonialism were as much of a factor in the contemporary geopolitics as the ideology of communism.  And he demonstrated that he was willing to at least attempt to advance American interest though neutrality; successfully in India and Indonesia but under extreme challenge in Laos. And his approach to both Laos and Vietnam was demonstrating that Kennedy was turning from away conventional military solutions to covert action. With “switchback” and a new NSAM he had already done so in Viet Nam and making preparations to shift covert action against Cuba to the Department of Defense.

Beyond that, in both Cuba and Vietnam, JFK was at least exploring the options for diplomatic outreach that might have led to compromise and some form of neutrality for both Cuba and North Vietnam, leaving regimes in place but ousting the growing Russian influence over each nation. Politically Kennedy had to find a solution for Cuba and for Vietnam; he had rejected a conventional military approach – coming to realize that even his Joint Chiefs could not come up with plans that met the basic sanity test for overt action. He was going to have to come up with a new approach – based on negotiation and neutrality. Both concepts which were nothing less than anathema to hard line CIA cold warriors who had been covertly fighting communism since 1947.

New Book

Deniable warfare is returning, there is simply no doubt about it.  And today’s versions appear to be (at least initially) far more successful than those of the Cold War era. That include Putin’s immense tactical success in the Ukraine and Crimea, with indications that he is going to be able to fully claim victory for both in the near future – that story is going largely unmentioned in the media, overwhelmed by political news of events in the United States and Europe.

I’ll be posting about it shortly, but along with other recent events, such as the totally successful and deniable air and missile strike against Saudi Arabia this fall, it illustrates that new tactics and practices of deniablity are definitely in play – with Africa once again emerging as a venue for deniable military action.

It’s been several years since I started my own re-investigation of American’s deniable warfare practices, most particular as pertained to its largest and most obvious failure – Cuba. Its been a highly educational experience, and once again I found that it was far more complex than the history books and anniversary media retrospectives have presented. To my surprise I found there were actually two failures of the project, one after some six months under Eisenhower, another another some seven months later at the Bay of Pigs.

I also found that the projects explicitly ordered by both presidents were not at all what the CIA actually delivered – which led me into a longer study of deniable action in general, seeking to discover whether the Cuba experience was an aberration. It also led me to compare the Kennedy administration’s deniable warfare projects with those of other American presidents as well as today’s actions.

The results of that study, as well as what is a new view of the Cuba Project of 1960/61, appears in my new book – In Denial / Secret Wars with Tanks and Air Strikes?   Among other things I think it is virtually unique in its level of detail presented in a military analysis of the Cuba Project and the failure at the Bay of Pigs.  If anything the true picture of that failure is actually worse than what its been pictured to be over the decades.

In Denial will be available in both Kindle and Print in April, 2020.  Its available on Amazon now for Kindle pre-order now and you can find it at:


JFK Assassination Research

Although it doesn’t seem that long ago, I began my own research into the assassination almost thirty years ago, in the early 1990’s – when research consisted of going to NARA for documents, or blindly ordering them and paying for 4 copies of the same FBI report.  At that time collaboration consisted of personal travel or CompuServe forum exchanges – at 1200 and then 2400 bits per second speed (OK, so now it does sound like long ago).

Over the years I did manage to connect personally with a number of the first generation researchers, including Anna Marie Kuhns Walko, Connie Kritzberg, Mary Ferrell, Jim Marrs, Gary Shaw, Jerry Rose, Gary Murr and others both from the Dallas area and well beyond. And I have spoken with a number of people who were in the Plaza on November, 22, 1963 or who participated in the local investigations (official and otherwise).

There have definitely been “generations” involved in this work, at present we are well into the fourth generation of researchers – and have access to a body of information which would have amazed those of the first generation. In fact in reviewing may of the written works even into the early 1990’s, I find much in them that requires revision or is simply incorrect based on the historical finds and document releases of the last two decades.  Much of what was mysterious then simply is not now; in its place we have new issues of evidence, new mysteries and new names.

I’ve tried to cover much of that in this blog, however I recently had an opportunity to chat for some two hours on the history of JFK research and the current state of the case with my friends Carmine and Chuck and you will find that conversation at the link below. I was very pleased with it and think it provides a good overview of this area of research as well as the current state of the case.

If you do listen and have questions, be sure to post them here and I’ll do my best to respond:

JFK Assassination Research History


Ukraine and Security

To say that the geopolitical situation surrounding Ukraine is complex would be a gross understatement; it took me more than a year of constant reading and research to build the background to write about it in Creating Chaos.  And much of that background had to come from Ukrainian and Russian journalists and historians, people on the ground for years who had worked at great risk to gain a true understanding of the situation.

At its core is a story of Russia and Ukraine which is reminiscent of  America’s sovereignty efforts in both Cuba and Vietnam in the 1960’s….it has far more to do with projection of power and spheres of influence than the interests of the citizens of the nations involved.   But that’s a long story, I think I did it justice in Creating Chaos and would be happy to discuss my analysis with anyone reading that work.

My publisher was convinced enough of the significance of the work to actually send copies to all the members of the House and Senate Intelligence committees. I wish they had read the book, or had their staff do so – it would have served them well in the committee testimony they are taking this week.

Which leads me to something not being discussed nearly enough in that discourse – although the media have picked up on a bit of the story they don’t have sufficient history to expand it to showcase the incredible level of American naivety and security compromise that existed in our last couple of years in the Ukraine.

We have known for some time that the internal training for this administration’s staff has been far below the standards for recent administrations – ranging from ethics sessions to security briefings.

I’ve commented in earlier on the fact that the president and his senior staff have not been participating in the types of emergency response planning – including military command and control practices – which have always been important but which were enhanced and taken seriously by all administrations following 9/11.

We have also known that at the very highest level, the president has compromised all standard communications protocols with the use of private cell phones, so have his family and apparently some of his senior appointees.

And now we know from the investigation of evens in the Ukraine, that both the president and his senior staff appear to be totally clueless in regard to security – not just in the United States but in a venue that in contemporary times has become a hub for intelligence wars, much as Berlin was after World War II or Mexico City became during the early 1960’s.

The fact that those in charge of our national security could be so ill informed and negligent in their diplomatic dealings in Ukraine is truly amazing – especially since Russia has successfully used phone intercepts from the Ukraine in political warfare against American diplomatic personnel there before – with one well known public example from 1964.

If you have Creating Chaos, you will find this on pages 288-290 where I discuss the fact that Russia helped install the very sophisticated phone monitoring network now existing in both Ukraine and Russia – the SORM system developed and fielded by the Russian FSB.

In 2014 the American Ambassador and another American diplomat conducted a non-encrypted call and the call was intercepted and recorded…actually ending up on a Russian internet propaganda channel – used in the new style political warfare in Ukrainian elections.

Given the practice of targeting communications of both American diplomats and business people, it is would be safe to assume that all unsecured calls are scooped up and monitored by both Ukrainian and Russian security services.  Diplomatic communications in Ukraine are equally, and likely more, compromised than they were in Mexico City circa 1963.

Of course we knew that then, and our intelligence community knows about Ukraine now. But once again it’s clear that few in the Trump administration are listening to them or showing any respect for their warnings.



Command Disconnects

While I’m very much still interested in and sill do some ongoing research on the political assassinations of the 1960’s, for the last decade or so my interests have become more oriented towards issues of national security and in particular the civilian command and oversight of military operations. My upcoming book In Denial will focus on those subjects – with extensive detail of how that process worked (or did not work) in the Cuba Project launched under Eisenhower and carried out by the CIA under JFK.

In Denial illustrates many of the command problems with covert/deniable action – as well as the extensive disconnects in command and control which occurred during the amphibious landings at the Bay of Pigs. One of the lessons that stands out most clearly in that disaster is the danger of “disconnection” between national policy, as directed by the Commander in Chief, and actual combat operations.

For three months in 1961, President Kennedy worked on defining the mission of the Cuba Project, even expressing it in a new national security memorandum. And throughout that time, the CIA’s senior officers largely ignored his direction in crafting their operational plans. Worse yet, they failed to elevate the issues raised by their own senior military commanders.

Unfortunately, decades later, we are seeing the same disconnections once again jeopardizing missions, and fragmenting our established national security strategies. This time the command and control problems are not within the chain of command; they are clearly with the Commander in Chief. We saw that first in the fiasco related to any structured military response to Iranian actions in the Gulf (and no, as CIC you don’t tweet to tell everyone you are planning and then calling off a major military action). Most recently we are seeing it in Syria.  There is simply no evidence of a structured mission, nor of consultation between the CIA and the president’s intelligence or military community.

When the CIC’s spontaneous orders jeopardize an ISIS operation that has been in the works for months, forcing a risky last minute effort to carry out the mission – it’s a good thing when it still works, but a very bad sign in terms of strategy, command, and control.

When that same impromptu command decision results in having your forces literally abandon their bases and equipment – as we just did in Syria, literally handing them over to the Russians, you are forced into extreme measures.  In Syria that led to the last resort of bombing to at least minimize the impact of an unplanned retreat – and when you start bombing your own bases, clearly things are out of control.

Then when you announce a withdrawal, then begin sending in even heavier forces, matters get extremely complex – and risky – for the forces in the field.

At this point in time, it is truly unclear if the American forces on the ground know their mission, or whether or not it will change tomorrow.  That is a very dangerous situation.

As a veteran myself, I feel quite strongly about our military forces being committed without clear missions, being forced to operate in a state of uncertainty, and constantly having their roles redefined – that increases the risk for them and in all honestly makes us look increasingly vulnerable to our adversaries.  It also undermines the sacrifices we ask them to make. And if that sounds like my attitude is showing – it is.

Oswald “Tagged”


Given the recent discussion of domestic contacts with Lee Oswald, combined with both FBI and CIA records which appear to have been gone missing, I was asked a very good question as to when and how I feel Oswald was “tagged” to link the JFK assassination to Cuba and Castro. For context I should point out that the “missing” files related to Oswald would logically relate to CIA and FBI associations with him prior to the assassination, associations pertaining to their use of him as a source of intelligence and possibly his value as a propaganda asset (in programs that never jelled due to the assassination).

Any possible use of Oswald by conspirators planning to attack JFK occurring within the CIA (at any level including field officers) would never have been put into a document; it is anathema to create written records relating to any sort of assassination within the CIA (or at least it was after about 1955; up to that point we do find numerous reference to the practice).

Given that, my best answer as to where and when Oswald was tagged begins in New Orleans. By the time he arrived there he was a known figure to both the FBI and CIA and was a cooperative source for the FBI.  He was also under consideration for CIA use in anti-Russian propaganda (reference his remarks in his unpublished manuscript of his time there). By the summer of 1963 he was also quite possibly a candidate for joint FBI/CIA use in the AMSANTA FPCC project.   Both of those associations would explain why there are missing records in both agencies.

One of the risks both agencies always face is having their sources  turned against them (whether knowingly doubled or patsied).  Both have suffered from that repeatedly and we know they do damage control by destroying records…its just SOP.

But as far as being tagged for an action against JFK, I believe it was Oswald’s high profile media visibility as a Castro supporter in New Orleans that got him picked as someone who would point to Castro. We have good evidence that he was being used by conspirators in some fashion in regard to a planned incident in the DC area – his own letters – verify that and associate him not only with Castro but with CPUSA. His reference to going “underground” was especially damming in regards to a communist connection (something the Warren Commission studiously ignored).

It was in August/September that he was first “tagged” to point to Castro….but unfortunately we have no clear clue by who….Nagell tells us it was anti-Castro Cubans posing as Castro agents and there is some evidence to support that. Certainly there is evidence that the FBI was encouraging him to make those sorts of contacts. But for whatever reason the DC incident aborted and he ended up in Dallas.

We have some pretty good leads that in Dallas he was doing some strange things on his own, it certainly appears that that he was voluntarily being a dangle to a variety of groups, most likely for the FBI.  That would make a lot of sense given the Cuban exile weapons buying efforts going on in the Dallas – which the FBI was all over and which led back to the House on Harlandale. That scenario is also corroborated by Hosty’s remarks about Oswald being under surveillance and meeting with subversives.

In Dallas – where his movements were being monitored – his use of aliases, post office boxes, fake names and fake ID’s suggest he was either playing at being a source on his own accord – or encouraged to do so. And that role was known to the people he was associating with – it was at that point he emerged as a definitive patsy, especially once he went to work at the TSBD.

Beyond that, the argument can be made against his being a knowing part the attack on the president because he continued search for other work, including applying for jobs outside downtown Dallas (that application is on record).

I believe Oswald’s tagging was the culmination of his activities over several months.  I also suspect if we could see the Joannides records we would have some support for that…which is why multiple judges have denied access to them. And if the FBI files in New Orleans had not been destroyed there would be more – ditto for all the FBI subversive division files in Dallas. And ditto for the Domestic Contact files.

Up to the day of the assassination it appears the FBI was watching Oswald and viewed him as a window into the subversive activities they were tasked to deal with, the CIA was monitoring his movements and very possibly had plans for him, most likely related to the FPCC.

And then someone who had seemed useful to both agencies turned into a terrible threat to each of them.

CIA Domestic Contacts

My last post raised the issue of why we appear to have found no CIA Domestic Contact reporting on Lee Harvey Oswald. We have solid indications that Domestic Contacts was interested in him following his return from Russia and initiated activity to monitor Lee and Marina within the White Russian community. Given that Oswald had not truly defected and had even been financially assisted in his return to the United States, he certainly would have been a subject of intelligence interest as to his Russian contacts and experiences.  We do know that the FBI directly contacted him on his return and asked him to report suspicious contacts – and he agreed to do so, later going so far as to directly approach the FBI in New Orleans.

Given standard practices we should find CIA Domestic Contacts with Oswald.  We find them with other individuals returning to the United States and having had contact with communist nations – including both Russia and Cuba. There are documents related to Domestic Contacts and Robert Webster, another American ostensibly “defecting” to Russia:

They maintained contacts with Americans doing international business – including those they found to be a waste of time (such as Mitch Werbell) and those that became long time CIA assets (William Pawley)

Anyone coming back to the U.S. from Russia or Cuba was routinely contacted (identified by the Support division at headquarters and referred to domestic contact field offices):

In short, there is every reason to expect that Domestic Contact files should have existed on Oswald, in several locations including headquarters, Dallas and New Orleans. We should have Domestic Contact documents in his 201 file.  I would encourage researchers to review there Oswald related documents to review them for any sign of routing to Domestic Contacts.  That would include distributions to or from “DCD” Domestic Contacts Division, C/DC/CIA  Chief/Headquarters Domestic Contacts.

An example of those being used can be found in the following Domestic Contact documents on Gerry Hemming after his return from Cuba – copied from Chief Contacts to CIA Security:

And in this widely circulated inquiry by Domestic Contacts into Frank Fiorini aka Sturgis – Domestic Contacts was not at all bashful about circulating its information even to the highest level offices:

Good hunting, either post here or email me if you find Oswald link to Domestic Contacts