Black Op Radio Interview 2015

I promised a follow-on post to “Investigating Benghazi”, one which at least briefly explores what has become the archetype for government response to crisis – virtually regardless of administration or party and within the very real legal constraints of the late 1940’s national security legislation.

In the interim, I wanted to share a recent interview with Len Osanic on Black Op Radio.  The interview gives a detailed overview of the 2015 Lancer conference and then goes into a fairly lengthy dialog on Surprise Attack.  Given that I’m normally pretty low key, I think even Len was surprise about how assertive I was being in regard to our discussion of 9/11.  I admit to having developed some very strong opinions on who were and were not doing their jobs before and during that attack; I think those opinions are quite well justified by the facts we have now.  I’ll provide the link to the interview below and you can listen to it yourselves if interested.  I’m on the same show as Marie Fonzi.  Marie and I have become email friends and she will be attending the November conference and I’m really looking forward to meeting her in person.

You can find both our interviews at:





Investigating Benghazi

There are a great many lessons to be learned from the attacks on the American ambassador and the CIA station in Benghazi, Libya. Many of those deal with the exposure of American facilities (both diplomatic and military) in countries which insist on restricting American security activities. Surprise Attack explores both diplomatic security issues and solutions, as well as the actual attacks on the two Benghazi facilities – one of which appears to have been initially unknown to AFRICOM, the military command with overall oversight for Libya and North Africa. All that is in the book so I won’t revisit that here.
But there is also a “post-Benghazi” story, which continues to resonate politically, even after the work of a host of official investigations. And I’m betting that most people who continue to read the press have not read the reports of those investigations – which being the obsessive personality that I am, I did as part of the Surprise Attack research. Several things stand out in those investigations, perhaps the first being that virtually none of them followed a straight forward line of inquiry.

By that I mean that the obvious path would be to document what should have happened in response to the initial awareness of the attacks, who had command responsibility, what resources had been designated for such contingencies and how effectively they were deployed. Proceeding down that track would quickly identify corrective actions as well as highlight any performance deficiencies. I encourage readers to pick at least one of the several investigations and compare that to the path actually followed in taking testimony.
Your options include the independent review board led by career diplomat Thomas Pickering and retired Admiral Mike Mullen, the House Intelligence Committee, the Senate Intelligence Committee, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the House Armed Services Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee – of course the current Benghazi Committee is still ongoing and you can follow its “email” focus in the news. For Surprise Attack’s purpose, I primarily reference the Armed Services committee reports as well as statements from the actual security personnel involved on the ground (both those of the seeming unreliable foreign contract employees and the experiences of the highly experienced CIA paramilitary employees).

The story that emerges is actually quite clear – much more so than the reports of the various committees – and has a great deal to do with covert CIA operations. That is an aspect either missing or intentionally understated in the official investigations, either due to a lack of focus by the committee members and staff or more likely an understanding that such things are restricted to the discussions of the actual Senate and House intelligence committees – and legally restricted from discussion elsewhere.

Of course that is a considerable legal handicap for those called on as witnesses, who are forced to limit their own testimony and to stick to approved cover stories in the face of any and all questions submitted to them. That reality is almost totally ignored by the media, it’s something we discussed at length in Shadow Warfare but given that it provides immense political opportunity during such inquiries, it’s something members of neither party are likely to forego.
However once you tune in to that aspect of official government committee investigations, a very definite pattern of post-event behavior tends to emerge. It’s a pattern that stretches across the decades, from the Warren Commission and the Gulf of Tonkin “attacks” to the Liberty and Pueblo losses and on to 9/11 and Benghazi. It a pattern that I tried to capture in Surprise Attack and I will blog on it in more detail in my next post, on the subject of crisis control.

Bernardo De Torres

Well folks, since I can’t seem to get any dialog started on my more contemporary works like Shadow Warfare and Surprise Attack, which are really quite relevant to current events, I’ll return to the JFK assassination with this post.  I do still follow that subject and speak on it from time to time.  Recently I participated in a fairly lengthy podcast dialog pertaining to one of the more interesting figures investigated in that case – by HSCA investigator Gaeton Fonzi and since Gaeton, much more infrequently by JFK researchers.  The man, Bernardo De Torres, stands out as one of the few individuals actively investigated by any official body for a personal connection to the conspiracy and as the man who provided what DA Garrison referred to as a major amount of “misinformation” to the single legal investigation which has ever been conducted. You can find the interview at this link:





9/11 Failures continued

I’m not going to go on with this much further unless there are comments and/or questions.  Surprise Attack visits this in great detail if the subject and actual analysis is of interest to you.  I have been surprised that after an extended media outreach at the time of the recent anniversary, there was no interest at all in the media in regard to reviewing the new research and analysis in the book.  It appears that the media is going to put a stake in the ground with the story as it was told in the first days following the events – not even taking the effort to look at the implications in the 9/11 report, the blatant stonewalling from the Bush administration and the serious suggestions of perjury and obstruction of justice pertaining to the White House, the FAA and the Air Force that the Commission developed. Legal action on the Commissions part was forestalled by political cautions and control but now that we have the full story I would have expected better of the media, instead what we seem to see is a replication of the JFK assassination.  The immediate, official story becomes somehow sacrosanct and on following anniversary dates it is trotted out under either the motif of simply acknowledging the event, respectfully of course, or of commenting that we will probably never understand its full complexity…  In regard to 9/11 that seems involve shaking of heads and statements such as. “yeah we have strong leads suggesting that a number of Saudi’s and Saudi charitable and financial infrastructure supported the attack but its not possible to really develop that at this late date so lets not go there”, which is probably true but also serves as a helpful diversion from looking ad the actual domestic security failures.

The following is an extension of the previous book excerpt which dealt with issues of air defense, of course that has to be coupled with access control by the FAA to be effective and the folloing is a brief except is a part of the book’s discussion of that:

“The FAA would appear to have had as much—or more—strategic warning of the aerial terror threat than any other government agency. The Clinton administration counterterror initiative paid particular attention to the FAA, with funding including more than $91 million for checked baggage screening and another $37 million for screening carry-on luggage. Monies for security research and vulnerability testing amounted to more than $25 million. The FAA security force was doubled, with funding of $18 million; canine search teams were funded to another $9 million. There were other monies for personnel additions as well as for passenger security database and terror profiling systems.
In statements and remarks given to the 9/11 Commission, both FAA and Department of Transportation managers essentially gave a disclaimer—to the effect that in 2001 nobody at senior levels of the Bush administration had ever talked to them about a terror threat and terrorism had not been a subject in cabinet meetings. Norman Mineta, head of the Department of Transportation and the cabinet-level officer responsible for the activities of the FAA, testified to the 9/11 Commission that he had never been briefed or advised or attended any inter-agency meetings dealing with terrorism. He also stated that the subject of terrorism and terror attacks had never been brought up in any of the White House meetings he had attended. When asked whether or not he felt that indicated a failure, his only response was “We had no information of that nature at all.” Mineta also appears to have had no knowledge of the ongoing NORAD hijack exercises (apparently involving at least some personnel at the FAA) that had been going on for some three years. Certainly there is no evidence that the FAA itself was raising alarms in regard to tracking or interdicting hijacked airliners.
While several of Mineta’s remarks about administration communications appear to be consistent with those of other principals, the 9/11 Commission’s inquiry did confirm that there was general knowledge of an aviation terror threat within the FAA. More specifically, the Commission noted that in 2001 the FAA itself provided warnings about terror threats. Between July 27 and September 11, the FAA had issued five new security directives to air carriers and an additional eight general warnings contained in FAA circulars. Several of those were in regard to overseas threats; one generically addressed the carry-on of disguised weapons.
In retrospect, with information circulating between multiple FBI field offices in regard to suspected terrorist aviation activities—including numbers of suspects taking flight training on commercial aircraft—tactical warnings of some sort of al-Qaeda “planes” operation seem to have been plentiful. During the spring and summer of 2001, FBI field offices reported on a flurry of young, foreign Arabian men involved in expensive commercial flight training; some of the men’s associates openly expressed their support of martyrdom attacks to FBI agents. In a classic sense, a number of key warning “indicators” were being tripped. Yet either the FBI was not providing any related warnings to the FAA or the warnings were not being addressed.
The FAA/DOT response indicated they were not told about such things—the corollary being that they neither aggressively asked for information about recent changes in the nature of terror threats nor responded to information given to their Security Division. If nobody was pushing information onto them, they had the responsibility for keeping themselves, their procedures, practices and training current with contemporary intelligence. It was the FAA/DOT’s responsibility to deny terrorists access to commercial aircraft, not only to the aircraft themselves but to the flight deck of those aircraft. Yet as of the fall of 2001 the FAA had initiated no new practices to screen terrorists during travel on domestic flights, to report suspects to law enforcement prior to boarding, to protect flight crews or to secure the flight deck. They had taken no initiative to explore known hijack issues—such as tracking aircraft with transponders turned off—with their military support, NORAD. Throughout 1941 Japanese observers in Hawaii reported on the American Navy’s offshore air surveillance patrols. Those patrols maintained the same flight schedules and routes, even after the war alert was issued, right up to the time of the actual Japanese attacks. Over the course of two years of taking domestic flights around the United States, the jihadi terrorists had observed no new “disruptive” commercial airline security measures of any sort; the airline security screening and on-board practices remained the same.
If anyone truly “didn’t get” terrorism, it appears to have been the DOT and FAA. In the previous chapter we have explored many of the details concerning exactly how they failed—even in the face of warnings by their own Red Teams. The question remains as to why FAA headquarters seems to have been so deeply mired in inertia. Certainly FAA personnel had observed the grounding of more than a dozen international flights out of Asia during the Bojinka incident; anyone with an interest in aviation security would have followed that story out of the Philippines, even if only in the newspapers. The terrorists’ trial was held in New York City and the incident had been the subject of ongoing newspaper coverage as recently as 1996. Media coverage alone should have triggered some ongoing interest and inquiries from the FAA to the CIA and FBI about an al-Qaeda focus on airliner attacks.
Nobody at FAA or DOT appears to have stepped up to mentally “owning” the responsibility for denying potential access to commercial aircraft. In 1941 the commanders in Hawaii and the Philippines constantly complained to the War Department about the lack of training, personnel and equipment. Those commanders knew they owned the defense of their commands. But as of 2001, there appear to be no signs that any senior FAA manager (other than Individuals on their own Red Teams) barraged their bosses with terror defense issues—if so, they made no mention of that to the 9/11 Commission.

Surprise Attack interview

Although the national media hasn’t come calling to talk about Surprise Attack (despite much media outreach by my publisher PR folks) – not even in regard to its new studies of 9/11 (which surprised me a bit) some of my own local media have shown an interest and the following interview covers both Shadow Warfare and Surprise Attack with a fairly extended discussion of 9/11.   Its from Oklahoma Gazette, which focuses on contemporary urban events and culture but also on Oklahoma artists and authors.  It’s a causal interview but fairly extensive; if anyone needs help with the accents just let me know…   The interview may be found at:



9/11 Failures

As you would imagine, we have learned a great deal about the security failures leading up to and on 9/11 during the past decade.  You are never going to have the full story on national security failures immediately after the event, nor even after the first investigation is completed.  A great deal of the information requested by such investigations becomes available to late for their inquiry and reports –  or has to be forced out over time. The media has chosen to revisit only the trauma of 9/11 on its anniversary dates, rather than to delve back into the causes and failures.  Given the lack of media attention I’ve decided to post a couple of small excerpts from Surprise Attack which may give a feel for what we now know, and what is addressed in the book. Of course excerpts are never written to stand alone so you just have to jump into them realizing that there is much context and detail before and after…with that said, here is the first which addresses certain failures in preparedness.

“Irrespective of certain public statements immediately following 9/11, the concept of using hijacked aircraft as weapons was not something that had never really occurred to anyone. In 1997, the highly popular action-adventure writer Tom Clancy opened his newest novel, Executive Orders, with a hijacked airliner being flown by a terrorist into the United States Capital building during a Joint Session of Congress. The crash killed the president, virtually all of his cabinet and Congress as well as majority of the Supreme Court and Joint Chiefs of Staff in one stroke. In point of fact, Clancy’s book had been so widely read that a great number of people immediately thought of his book even in the earliest hours of the 9/11 attacks. Clancy was interviewed on CNN that day—in regard to his apparent prediction of terrorists using hijacked airliners as weapons. While the concept was no surprise to him, he stated he would simply never have thought of simultaneous attacks.
There was strategic warning of terror attacks against targets inside the continental United States, and both counterterrorism professionals and the American military had conducted simulations and exercises in line with private and commercial aviation attacks. In 1998 a White House counterterror exercise included a scenario in which terrorists loaded a Learjet with explosives and “took off on a suicide mission to Washington.” More significantly, in terms of actual interdiction of such an attack, NORAD actually exercised against the threat of hijacked airliners being used as weapons in a variety of ways—including being crashed into buildings. Such exercises were performed from 1998 to 2001, and according to the exercise summaries, FAA representatives had participated. While none of the exercises were an exact match for the attack of 9/11, several were quite similar and involved the necessity of shooting down commercial aircraft during an attack.

NORAD exercised in defending against a wide variety of aerial terror attacks, some exceedingly similar in detail to those that occurred on 9/11. It is difficult to imagine that such exercises did not surface the same basic issues—loss of tracking due to transponder shutdown, low-altitude evasive maneuvers and time-critical authority for military action against a threatening aircraft. Those were the same concerns that Richard Clarke [National Counter-terrorism Coordinator] relates were discussed in 1996, during counter terror planning for the Atlanta Olympics. In his session with the 9/11 Commission, NORAD commander Ralph Eberhart commented on the general lack of interest within the FAA of participating in NORAD exercises but provided no details on the actual level of FAA participation or the individuals involved. He made no mention of any standing concerns relating to radar tracking threatening aircraft, or of the lack of pre-designated rules for engaging or shooting down commercial airliners.
Based on Eberhart’s remarks, it appears that the NORAD exercises had not sufficiently surfaced some very fundamental real-world issues. He stated that all the attacks simulated by NORAD assumed that even after being hijacked, the aircraft crew would be in control, that the aircraft’s transponders would be on and “squawking” and that there would be a “substantial” period to pursue the rules of engagement with National Command Authority. The 9/11 Commission appears not to have pursued questions of lessons learned from the NORAD exercises or of “after-action” assessments. However, based on the events of 2001, it appears that the exercises must not have fully tested real-world elements of air defense coordination and command, coordination with the FAA and involvement of the full chain of command up to National Command Authority. The exercises also appear not to have surfaced the need for pre-designated detailed Rules of Engagement and guidance for military action against commercial aircraft.
During the first hours of the 9/11 attacks there seems to have been a critical element missing from the air defense—beyond issues of inability to track aircraft without live transponders. It constantly shows up in the dialog at NEADS and in their communications with combat control at CONR. They needed rules of engagement, and they needed instructions on what they could do in using force to engage passenger-carrying hijacked airliners. Either such rules (ROE) did not exist or had not been communicated to the front-line NORAD air defense. In his interview with the 9/11 Commission, NORAD commander Eberhart notes that he spent time after 9/11 developing new, formalized rules of engagement for such circumstances.
Given all the exercises that NORAD and the FAA conducted over the previous three years, it seems that after-action debriefings should have made it quite clear what would be needed if hijackers did seize an aircraft and move to use it as a weapon—regardless of whether that be as a delivery system for chemicals or explosives or with the fueled aircraft as a single gigantic bomb. With the history of the NORAD preparations, it must have been frustrating for those involved in the exercises to hear a post-attack remark such as that from the deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Meyers: “You hate to admit it, but we hadn’t thought about this”.
In 1996 Richard Clarke had chaired a counter-terror working-group discussion, with a team that included FBI and FAA advisers. The threat of aerial terror attacks proved to be one of the most challenging addressed by the team. Clarke asked whose job it was to prevent such attacks—and got no answer. After much head-shaking and in considerable frustration he asked the group what could be done; the only answer he received was from the FBI representative: “Don’t let them hijack an airliner in the first place.” Clarke described no comment from the FAA representative, whose agency represented the final line of defense against a hijacking.”

9/11 Roots

I did a podcast interview on Surprise Attack over this last weekend – for about an hour – and that was little enough time to even hit the high points. As you can imagine, one of the main areas of interest was the attacks on America of September, 2001. And once again I was taken aback by how little the media has done to revisit that topic in any meaningful fashion, leaving most people with little more understanding of it than they gained during the first few days following the tragedy.
In light of that I’m going to devote a couple of posts during days leading up to the anniversary of the attacks, certainly nothing near the level of detail in the book but with the intent of surfacing a few things we know now that never, ever get into the anniversary programs.

The first point is that is that although the organizational roots of September 11 lay in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the operational story – and the airliner focus – began with the Bojinka airliner attack plan of 1995. The Bojinka terror attack was planned to involve up to a dozen commercial airliners, resulting in a loss of American lives greater than that which later occurred in the 2001 attacks. It involved the same al Qaeda network which would ultimately organized the strikes of 9/11 and even some of the same individuals.
The Bojinka plot received extensive media coverage in the U.S., especially since certain of its figures were charged with and later would be tried for the World Trade Center bombing. In reality, the attack had only been aborted by local police and security action on the ground at its point of origin – the Philippines – and by the immediate action to ground airliners already on the way to the U.S. That action was taken by Richard Clarke, heading the NSC counter terrorism effort and by President Clinton’s National Security advisor Tony Lake and White House Chief of Staff Frederico Pena.
Al Qaeda operatives associated with Bojinka had a very specific focus on airliners, an early interrogation revealed plans to crash an airliner into CIA headquarters. The al Queda focus on airliners was mentioned in news reports of the time and was communicated to FBI staff pursuing prosecution of the World Trade Center bombing. It was also known to Clarke and other American counter terrorist specialists. One of the threats considered in regard to the Atlanta Summer games of the 1996 Olympics was that of an aircraft being flown into the Olympic grounds. Richard Clarke led the counter terrorism effort to protect that event and he was highly sensitive to both al Qaeda and aircraft threats, communicating with both FBI and FAA team members about air attack issues. Exactly why both those concerns did not translate into the first year of the Bush administration, with Clarke retaining his advisory position, is a large part of the 9/11 story.
The Bojinka plot, aircraft threats to the Atlanta Olympics and some three years of America air defense exercises against hijacked airliners, documented in a report provided under duress and very late in the official 9/11 Commission inquiry – all subjects which draw an absolute blank when I introduce them to any dialog on the 2001 attacks. Why is that, given that the attacks are still very much contemporary American history? It’s hard to say but the fact that so many senior officials rushed to say that aircraft terror attacks had simply never been thought of prior to September 11, may be part of the reason. Of course it’s embarrassing make such statements, but perhaps less embarrassing than to acknowledge that such threats were indeed known and that no effective defense was put into place.
But I’ll get to that point in another post….

A Political H Bomb

It looked like it could be just that back in 1967. It was a revelation of an American assassination effort against a foreign leader. Beyond that it purportedly provided proof that President Kennedy had been killed by a Communist conspiracy.  The potential consequences for the Johnson Administration, the Democratic party and the CIA were immense. What made the whole thing even more shocking was that the news was coming from an extremely credible source, an individual that both the FBI and CIA knew had personally been at the center of a series of CIA assassination efforts over some three years and he had been working directly with the CIA officer assigned to establish an Executive Action program capable of covertly eliminating foreign leaders.

It should have generated immense media attention and investigations by the Justice Department, perhaps the establishment of a new Presidential inquiry. What did happen is fascinating and may in itself tell us something very important about the conspiracy and the individuals that were involved in the murder of President Kennedy.  If that sounds interesting, you can find the details at the presentation I made for the AARC – the link is below:

If that link is not clickable for you just copy and paste it into the web address line on your browser and it should take you directly to the presentation.



Surprise Attack now available

I’m excited, Surprise Attack is now in stock and shipping from Amazon. It is in bookstore distribution and available for order – but it probably won’t make it on to the shelves for another couple of weeks.  Should certainly be there around Labor Day. We actually beat the publishers target release by a few weeks, not always an easy thing to do, especially when with end notes and index it came in at a whopping 568 pages.  Counterpoint did an fantastic job with the layout and font sizing; it’s amazingly readable for a book that size.
It’s had positive advance reviews from Kirkus and Publishers Weekly; a Library Journal article described it as being among the most “intriguing” books for this fall. That’s about as good an adjective as a history book is going to get, especially when you make a serious effort at being objective and don’t try to play to a particular “base”. I’ve noticed that when I say things people already agree with it’s very well received; when I don’t I suddenly become a lot less bright – but since I’m not running for office and not writing against a given political agenda, that just comes with the territory.
I’ll have more to say about the book of course, it’s particularly important to me because I constantly encounter incomplete and misinformation about the events that it covers, especially in regard to some more contemporary events. I can’t promise readers they will like everything in the book, that’s unlikely given its subject and breadth. What I can promise is that it’s as close to real history as I could take it.  If it sounds interesting, buy it, read it, pass the word about it to your friends, relay it on social media and I’ll be here to respond to your questions as comments as I have on all my other works.

Note:  The publisher advises me that it takes two three weeks for Barnes and Noble to actually get the books into all their stores. In addition, for their larger stores  Surprise Attack  should  begin showing up on their “new non-fiction book” stands/tables beginning the week of September 22.  How and when the independent book stories shelve it is an individual matter – so feel free to go into your local store and ask for it…repeatedly….no need to be shy…

Phony War

The first few months of WWII in Europe are often referred to as the “phony war”, nations had declared war on each other, mobilizations had occurred but there was no widespread or large scale combat. Civilian populations remained largely untouched, other than by constant media coverage of a war that was not personally involving them. It leads me to wonder what phrase future historians will use to describe America’s “wars” in the early 21st Century.

We have been in almost constant overseas combat since 2001, but there is no draft nor general military mobilization – in fact in the most recent years force levels of both personnel and equipment have been reduced. Regular military units simply serve more overseas “rotations” and we have constantly deployed the National Guard internationally and into foreign combat. A limited number of military families deal with an increasing percentage of injuries and losses of loved ones, but not the general population. Instead of increasing taxes to support the war efforts, taxes have been either reduced or frozen – and with no massive war bond initiatives such as seen in WWII.
With a bit of political maneuvering the cost of the actual warfare has been moved outside the regular budget, resulting in special and much less visible appropriations; its impact has primarily been on debt levels and that has been very real. And there has been no sign of “dollar a year men”, senior industry figures or scientists/engineers donating their time or resources to our war on terror, or on ISIS. It’s been pay as you go for the government, and often with cost plus contracts.
In the more contemporary chapters of Shadow Warfare, we traced the evolution of “gray warfare”, involving a mix of intelligence and special operations personnel in a fashion that keeps much of their combat operations out of the media. Equally importantly we explore the emergence of “contract warfare”, where both combat and support activities are privatized and performed by corporate entities or non-government entities. Unlike the “phony war” this combat is very real, highly targeted and while it sometimes involves civilian casualties, they are nothing on the scale found in earlier warfare. All of which means the combat goes on and on, the media is never involved on the ground as it was during the Vietnam era, no draftees are involved and the casualties are very real but largely invisible in the main stream media. While the relatives of the combatants continually deal with the results, the general civilian population suffers not at all, other than with its concerns about increasing government intrusion, loss of privacy and similar issues.
I’ve previously made a number of comments about the negative results of contracting security operations to private firms – in respect to both the impact on the uniformed military combat and on the military operations themselves. Shadow Warfare gives that story in some detail, using security contractors in place of uniformed military nicely moves the truly hard, fundamental decisions off the table, its results are obvious from Iraq to Benghazi. Beyond that it’s truly amazing that the fantastic support and construction scandals have escaped true national attention, including from all of the current presidential candidates. Senator Truman made a name for himself investigating contracting scandal during WWII, yet that pales in comparison to the graft, corruption and loss of American money in Iraq and Afghanistan. If you question the extent of the scandal, read the following articles:
The scope of the fraud is reinforced by the fact that the investigation into Iraq/Afghanistan contract violations could only estimate the overall amount since record keeping was so poor that it could not be sure if it was only $31 billion or as much as $60 billion. In any event, it’s not reassuring that once again, as we are putting a limited number of personnel back into Iraq, the same contracting firms and personalities are again getting multiyear contracts for everything from logistics to security.

The only conclusion that I can draw from all of this is that our continuing combat is very real for those involved, but as far as the nation is concerned, it’s not real at all. Which means that it is not generally painful enough to force any true national involvement – such as say a declaration of war – under virtually any circumstances. That includes the months long, brutal rape of an American hostage by the ISIS leader. If that sort of incident does not lead to anything more than a handful of news stories, then the American Congress is indeed doing nothing more than enabling ongoing combat – with limited loss of life but ongoing profit for what has to now be called a “military contracting complex” rather than a “military industrial complex”.