Zeroing in on the Conspiracy

I was pleased to do a recent extended interview with Doug Campbell, I always enjoy a dialog with Doug as he brings in a great deal of focus and digs deeply into areas that are not routinely discussed in conversations about the JFK assassination. If you are interested, the program it is archived and available at:

I’ll be happy to respond to comments and thoughts here as well as on Doug’s own Dallas Action Facebook page.

Go To Guys

Sorry for the recent absence, but I’m returning for a couple of new posts to consider the question of political assassination as actually carried out by the CIA early in the Cold War – in an effort to further explore where the actual Dallas attack on JFK most likely might originated. To do that I think its helpful to profile a few key personalities in light of what we actually know about individuals who are most often discussed in conversations about CIA orchestrated murders – and most specifically who they turned to in order to make such things happen.

Richard Bissell, perhaps the senior officer involved with the most actual assassinations, can be seen to have turned to both his country station chiefs and to the CIA’s Staff D to carry out murders. The weapon of choice in such actions appears to have been poison, although that virtually never worked and successful killings tended to be carried out more directly, with rifles and pistols employed by surrogates already working with CIA field officers.

The murder of Patrice Lumumba is a prime example, with Bissell (tasked by Eisenhower and Alan Dulles with eliminating Lumumba) turning to Sydney Gottlieb in the technical division for poison and then wrestling with a variety of Staff D officers (who pushed back against being involved) only to turn to foreign assets already employed by a European station/Luxemburg to try (and fail) to administer the poison carried to the Congo by Gottlieb.

In parallel, Bissell had charged the Congo station chief with the project and that individual turned to his own established network of contacts to find individuals who were willing to take money and CIA support – and who ultimately kidnapped and orchestrated Lumumba’s death. The who operation was chaotic, dysfunctional and only succeeded because of the local connections of station chief Develin.

The first effort to assassinate Fidel Castro turned out to be very similar, Bissell struggling to find some asset to carry out the task, turning to the CIA’s Office of Security for referrals to people with connections inside Cuba who could/would carry it out and ending up with John Roselli, former casino owners with contacts in Havana – the effort ending in yet another series of dysfunctional and ineffective efforts to carry out a poison attack. Its pretty clear that at that point the CIA had no cadre of experienced or expert “go to guys” for assassination.

Which is why when Richard Helms reactivated the Castro assassination effort, and handed the task off to William Harvey, Harvey essentially did a reset with Roselli and the poison effort. As of 1962 Harvey himself had no “go to guys”.  In fact, for his Staff D assignment (which involved break ins, burglaries and strong-arm work) he also had turned to the Office of Security and to European field stations to recruit the “right” type of people for such illegal actions.

Interestingly though, Harvey also reached out to someone he thought might have expertise and connections in that area – James Angleton. And Angleton was eager and apparently connected to the right people to at least make certain introductions for Harvey, including to British intelligence agency personnel. While Angleton cannot be tried to any particular assassination project, he certainly did have contacts with which he could discuss such things.

Beyond that Angleton, formerly the head of Staff D himself – and with all the dirty work and criminal connections that implied – operated on a global level, including the penetration of the Chinese embassy in Havana by a very special technical collections team led by David Christ).

Angleton was arguably the most independent operator at senior levels of the CIA. His history (including his WWII OSS work in Europe) reveals a passion for making connections and paying for information, becoming a master of collecting rumor, gossip and so-called intelligence – much of it proved in time to be woefully inaccurate or false. It was only decades later that Angleton’s legendary reputation for intelligence collection effectively imploded.

When William Colby took over the Agency and directed an inquiry into its counter intelligence work it was discovered that Angleton had investigated and declared some 22 Soviet defectors to be double agents – when in fact they had been legitimate. I review Angleton’s obsessions and failures in Chapter 14 of NEXUS, but, in short, it can be said that Angleton had extensive connections with both criminal networks and foreign intelligence services (particularly Europe and with Israel) and that he made a career of talking, gossiping, and shopping ideas and information.

What can also be said is that Angleton built a huge network of contacts, domestically and globally. He was designated as the CIA liaison to the FBI and in conjunction with Staff D work did repeatedly ask them for help or assistance with wire taps and burglaries – including for recommendations for access to underworld assets including mob lawyers. However, the FBI appears to have thought less of him as a resource, simply designated Angleton as “confidential informant T-100”

There is also little doubt that Angleton largely operated outside the CIA normal organization and its standard oversight protocols, with his own contacts, his own separate file system, even his own codes. His paranoia and his suspicions were overwhelming – as an example he viewed the following individuals as being actual Soviet agents:

Harald Wilson (British Prime Minister), Olof Palme (Swedish Prime Minister), Willey Brandt (West German Prime Minister), Averill Harriman (Gov. of New York), Lester Pearson (Canadian Prime Minister) and Henry Kissinger (Secretary of State and National Security Advisor).

If anyone thinks all this is exaggerated, I suggest a Tom Mangold’s excellent book on Angleton, Cold Warrior, James Angleton.

Yet perhaps the most interesting thing is that despite Angleton’s extensive contacts and his tendency to talk about even the most sensitive and sensational subjects,  there is little evidence that he actually did much more than “stir the pot”. His networks were extensive, his results – certainly in counter intelligence and even in assisting Harvey in an effort to assassinate Castro – were fruitless, negligible and hugely damaging to American intelligence (particularly in regard to American verification of Israel’s nuclear capability and war plans).

In my next post I’ll dig a bit more deeply into CIA personnel who did have “go to guys”, people who did carry out assassinations – in isolation from headquarters and with imminent “deniability”.

Inside the Agency – 1963

This is the third post addressing a perennial question in regard to conspiracy in the murder of President Kennedy. It was actually the first question asked by his brother on the afternoon of the assassination – asked to the Director of the CIA. Robert Kennedy directly asked the Director whether or not the CIA had been involved in the assassination. Tipping Point explores the context which led RFK to immediately suspect the CIA and its anti-Castro surrogates in the covert efforts to oust Fidel Castro.

However, Director McCone was not part of the long time OSS cadre which had launched the CIA into the Cold War nor did he have any extensive operational experience. McCone had come out of the private sector and himself had very little experience in intelligence, he had largely been dealing with strategic national security issues such as the Soviet missile crisis and the American involvement in SE Asia. While he had opposed the coup against Diem, he was in support of JFK’s plan to accelerate covert military action against North Vietnam. Some solid context in regard to his relationship with JFK is contained in the following paper:

Looking downwards inside the Agency in 1963, in regard to political assassination things had changed from the era of the Dulles brothers. Richard Bissell was gone and no longer represented the nexus for assassination suggested by the in house gossip that described he and Tracy Barnes as being in charge of the CIA’s “health alteration committee”.

Richard Helms followed Bissell as the key player responsible for regime change activities, including efforts where assassination remained an option. However Helms was more of a political (read career oriented) animal (having protected himself by avoiding the the disastrous Cuba Project) and an expert at even internal deniablity. When he turned over political assassination to William Harvey in Staff D, he did so in such a matter that even Harvey could only guess at where the orders were originating. One thing that can be said about Helms is simply that nobody, including Congress, could expect the whole truth from him.

In one sense its hard to see Helms committing himself to anything other than his career, of being an efficient administrator and a generic defender of the Agency. He was so effective and so sincere at doing those things that he developed a real reputation for honesty. As noted in the proceeding that reputation should have been considered as quite “situational” but it did stick though most of his career. This article gives some interesting insight into Helms and why he was trusted as a source when he most likely should not have been

As to political assassination specifically, by 1962 Helms had assigned that task to William Harvey – but Harvey had run afoul of RFK during the Mongoose project (both men were “hands on” and Harvey had no respect at all for RFK based on his lack of experience and personal engagement with anti-Castro Cuban activists). Still, Castro remained a declared target and even though Harvey was reassigned in 1963 its difficult to tell exactly when and if Harvey’s program against Castro actually shut down (it may have been even more difficult for those involved). Certainly Harvey stayed in the Staff D intelligence loop through the summer of 1963. However in terms of assassination, that appears to have moved over a topic being discussed under the new head of the anti-Castro effort, Desmond Fitzgerald.

So for a “tops down” CIA plot against JFK, the most well placed people to contemplate such a thing, and with access to the assets to make it happen (in particular in a form which would use anti-Castro assets and attempt to blame the attack on Fidel Castro), would seem to be Helms, Fitzgerald or Harvey. Note: While some will still champion Dulles, who retained some high level influence with old line CIA cadre, he would have to have personally co-opted someone within the CIA’s operations directorate, with direct access to assets either via Staff D or in Miami. Either that or taken entirely separate measures outside the Agency.

So back to “tops down” inside the Agency. In considering Richard Helms it is hard to picture him as a virulent enemy of President Kennedy – or even willing to later smear his reputation when pressured to do so under the Nixon Administration:

He certainly did not agree with JFK on all points and during 1963 was unilaterally opposed to any number of administration discussions of negotiations with Castro or a a change in the basic regime change strategy. This is clear in an ongoing series of documents and extends into the fall when JFK informed the CIA of his back channel contacts with Castro.

Helms openly opposed it, came up with a variety of delaying tactics (such as “war gaming” contacts before any dialog began) and began efforts to monitor and possibly obstruct the Cuban side of the effort – targeting Castro’s contact personnel via CIA assets at the UN, via Miami Station and even thorough AMOT intelligence collection in Mexico City. He was definitely in the “opposition” camp, but very openly and very bureaucratically.

Next down, and someone with a much more direct control over assets, would be Fitzgerald. However all signs are that he had signed on to the administration regime change track and was busying himself with all the new projects ranging from AMTRUNK and AMLASH to autonomous action via AMWORLD and even direct action using JMWAVE for the new Commando Mambises missions. If anything he was excited by the fact that as of October he had managed to get JFK to approve an entire series of new sabotage missions against Cuba.

Finally, there remains William Harvey, no longer in the direct chain of command (although exactly who would know he was not is an open question) and with experience under Mongoose which involved not only John Roselli but direct contacts with the full range of JMWAVE operations personnel and with a good many of their Cuban assets – including personnel involved in both poison and sniper attacks on Castro. Given his personally acknowledged and highly emotional attitudes towards both RFK and JFK, he would seem one credible starting point inside the agency, even if no longer in the direct chain of command. Beyond that there is every reason to believe he was capable of autonomous action and attracted similar personalities to himself…a classic man of action.

Of course the question remains as to whether Harvey would even have been necessary, certainly he was in no position to manage or direct the operational aspects of an attack in Dallas, or of the framing of Lee Oswald.

But that is a different question entirely.

Track 1 vs. Track 2

In my last post I outlined the history of two tracks for political assassination within the CIA during the Cold War. The first track was essentially “tops down”, in some instances beginning with remarks from the president and put into action by orders from the Director of the Agency.  Examples cited included Eisenhower’s elimination remark in regard to Patrice Lumumba, and Clinton’s kill order on Osama Bin Laden. In other instances the initiative came from within “senior levels” of the Agency – as when the head of Western Hemisphere operations proposed the “elimination” of Fidel Castro.

In practice assassinations efforts were actually overseen by senior officers in the Plans/Operations Directorate.  While best known for his success in technology projects related to the U-2 and satellite reconnaissance, Richard Bissell’s move into covert operations led him to play a key role in assassination activities. His activities included launching two separate efforts to eliminate Lumumba (one using Staff D external assets) and again turning to Staff D (and external assets) in a poison effort against Fidel Castro. For a time Bissell seems to have been at the center of CIA political assassinations activities – all of which involved the use of assets from outside the CIA (often criminal assets) or the use of CIA surrogates (as with the shipping of rifles to the Dominican Republic which were ultimately used in the assassination of Rafael Trujillo).

Bissell, acting though his aide Tracy Barnes, appears to have also exercised a decision making role in regard to assassination proposals coming up from inside the CIA (Track 2) , including those forwarded up though case officers. . In one instance Barnes had proceeded with with a plan (proposed by a Cuban contact) to kill Castro by downing a Cuban airliner – only to have the project stopped by Bissell.

Yet following the disaster at the Bay of Pigs, by early 1962 Bissell had left the CIA, replaced by Richard Helms. And Helms, in a repetition of practices, ssigned the head of Staff D, William Harvey, to the task of political assassination. Harvey, having also been assigned to head the CIA portion of the ongoing effort to over throw the Castro regime, reactivated the earlier effort against Castro.

The point of reiterating this history is literally that it is history. The activities described above were discovered by the Church committee in its work on CIA political assassination. While there were limited paper trials for certain of them, CIA funds had been approved, and the efforts which came from the top down (Director level or Deputy Director level) are visible as sanctioned projects. Humorously enough some of the records come from within operations, with supervisors requiring formal authority to spend budgeted money or assign personnel without someone telling them what was going on (as with the Castro assassination plot or the problems getting someone inside Staff D to accept the directive to target Lumumba).

Where matters get much less clear, are those assassination activities that appear to have been enabled by CIA case and field officers, most often responding to proposals from their surrogates. Examples include a series of rifle attack plans against Castro which appear to have been suggested by paramilitary assets including Felix Rodriquez in early 1961.

As I’ve written about in multiple books, there appears considerable evidence that field officers working on anti-Castro projects had become very much involved in enabling surrogates simply by allowing them to operate inside sanctioned activities, using monies, weapons and even sanctioned missions for secondary purposes. Individuals such as Rip Robertson carried piggybacked attacks in that manner, and Tony Sforza can be shown to have enabled surrogates in assassination efforts not only inside Cuba but on to the Allende coup in Chile in the early 1970s.

Which leads to the subject of my next post. In that I’ll take a look at what was happening within the CIA in regard to JFK in 1963, and the activities which provide some insight as to whether we see a Track 1 tops down vs. a Track 2 conspiracy leading to the attack on the President in Dallas. .

Political Assassination tracks

One of the perennial questions in regard to the JFK assassination – at least in regard to any involvement of the CIA or its personnel – has always revolved around the origins of political assassination within the Agency. Somewhat amazingly, after the work of the Church Committee and decades of research we really have a great deal of information and examples of how the actual history of political assassination. I incorporated a much of that in NEXUS, including the fact that there were always two tracks . One track being top down, with remarks normally originating in NSC meetings and in some instances directly from the sitting President.

We can now even appreciate the word games played inside that track, Eisenhower (used to giving commands) was quite direct stating in one meeting that “Lemumba must be eliminated”. Later, attendees in the meeting admitted that they interpreted that as an order actually kill Leumuba”. In another example President Clinton specifically issued a “kill order” on Osama Bin Laden, as an outstanding threat to American national security.

More generally, the standard word games found at the upper levels of American government have been much more discrete, offering all involved a path to denial if that should turn out to be needed. Richard Nixon was normally quite cautious about his language and more recently Donald Trump, with decades of business practice experience, appears to have substantially raised the bar on nebulous wording – a skill which can leave CIA Directors and even Attorney Generals in uncomfortable positions:

Still, whatever the wording, for matters to proceed a senior official, had to interpret his boss’s orders and begin a project to carry them out. And that process involves people, monies and communications – all of which do leave a trail. In the instance of Lemumba, CIA Director brought his Richard Bissell into action (Bissell having already been associated with such activities). In turn Bissell reached down to Staff D, was rejected by one officer but ultimately launched two separate efforts against Lemumba, one (poison) involving Sydney Gottlieb and technical services and the other using his Africa Division chief and the head of the field station in the Congo (kidnapping, murder contracts and other similar devices being put on the table though them). All of which we can now find in the communications and activities records.

In another effort during that era Bissell also became involved with the murder of Fidel Castro, again with separate tracks, one including poison and the other ambushes and rifle attacks. Yet again, money and assets were involved as well as operational activities and we have records of those as well (although only have only become available decades later).

History shows us that top down operations do leave tracks, however nebulous the remarks that put them in progress. This is all something discussed at length in a recent dialog I had with Chuck Ochelli concerning my work in NEXUS. However the other thing that came out, probably more clearly than I had written it or perhaps even discussed it was the nature of the “bottoms” up assassination track within the CIA. You can listed to the interview with Chuck at:

What is most important to understand is that there was a separate track which involved CIA officers, if not senior personnel, in assassinations. That track involved the surrogates being used in various operations, and began at the case officer and field officer level. In NEXUS I wrote abut it first in Iran and then in Guatemala, with proposals by the locals (revolutionaries, ex-patriots, etc) that the CIA was working with on regime change projects.

As it turns out those individuals, being at risk themselves, very often see political assassination as the quickest route to regime change, the victory of their movements and their own success – quickest, less costly, low profile and easiest to organize. Especially if the CIA officers they are working with can be convinced to continue the financial, weapons and other related support that they can use in such efforts.

It seems CIA case officers themselves sometimes endorsed such views; I give numerous examples in NEXUS and in my more recent book IN Denial as well. In some instances approval was given verbally, with a head nod, and the support required could not be distinguished from the activities already in process with those surrogates. In other instances it was a bit more obvious – as when the trainers (mudslinging David Morales) provided an actual manual on how to conducted assassinations as part of their support for the Guatemala project.

I’ll provide some further examples of the Track 2 (upwards) (which was never “sanctioned” in the manner of Track 1 (downwards) in a follow-on post – and get into an examination the the CIA activities of 1963 which might give us an insight into which might well have been in play in regard to the murder of President Kennedy.

Work in Progress

I’ve not been blogging much the last couple of weeks, but things have been busy. I recently did a two hour show with Chuck Ochelli on Someone Would Have Talked and most recently a lengthy interview with Alan Dale on JFK Facts on the evolution of all my JFK related work, from the earliest research though the three book trilogy that ends with Tipping Point. If you would like to take a listen you can find that interview here:

In regard to Tipping Point, while I had not anticipated it being able to carry it much further at this late date, new work by David Boylan appears to offer some real potential for further developing both the leads which Matthew Smith opened up in regard to incidents involving Ray January and Red Bird Airport. We are both pursuing that, its the sort of thing that involves deep document dives and lots of dot connecting, but it has the potential of further closing the loop on the individuals most directly involved with the Dallas attack, and in the effort to connect the assassination to Lee Oswald and Cuban sponsorship.

Beyond that, some of the readers engaged with Tipping Point have expressed a desire to expand and enhance the book’s index. If you have any interest in working on a team to develop an expanded index, including your preferred persons or topics of interest, please drop me a note at

In other work I remain very much involved with two teams working on research projects related to UFOs/UAPs – one dealing with a statistical characteristics study and the other with and effort to evaluate patterns of reports with the goal of assessing intentions, particularly intentions related to national security. Both are multiyear projects requiring lots of grunt work doing collections, database analytics and graphing. Its going to be a good while before we have something solid enough to put into a paper, but in the interim I’ll try to at least share some observations as we progress.

Unidentified Reading Aids Part 2

Here are the rest of the graphics and illustrations I would recommend to anyone reading the book. If you don’t have it and are curious to why or how these particular graphics relate to the book just ask away here.

American atomic weapons manufacturing and test complex –

Hanford, Sandia, Nevada test site, Los Alamos, Pantex, Oak Ridge, Savannah

River, Rocky Flats

Hanford radioactive materials production complex

Oak Ridge materials complex

Weapons Testing – Radiation Fall-Out Patterns over the United States

Newspaper headline images

Blue Book Special Report #14

AEC Atomic Weapons Stockpile Sites / Q Areas

    Site A – Manzano Base adjacent to Kirtland Air Force Base and Sandia Base

    Site B – Clarksville Base, adjacent to Campbell Air Force Base and

Fort Campbell (Tennessee and Kentucky)

    Site C – Medina Base, adjacent to Kelly and Lackland Air Force Bases


    Site D – Killeen Base, adjacent to Gray Air Force Base and Fort Hood


Killeen Base map and image references:

Manzano Base atomic weapons storage site

Kirtland AFB UFO incident

Kirtland AFB map

SAC bomber base map

SAC Bomber and Missiles Bases

Sandia Base

SAC Chrome Dome Flights

Artic Region

Unidentified Reading Aid / Part 1

The good news is that without any particular explanation or communication with my publisher, Amazon has again made Unidentified available for direct sales and shipment.  It’s a bit mysterious, but considering similar short term availability issues with other books it may just reflect they have caught up with print on demand and shipping backlogs.  You will find both the EBook and Print versions here:

I’d been working on a list of graphics and illustration links to assist anyone reading the book and to celebrate I’m posting them below.  The links are pretty dense so I’m going to do it in two parts.  If you have the book it would be interesting to scan back though it and take a look at the graphics, if you are just beginning to read it hopefully it will add to the experience.  I’ve arranged it with the historical flow of the text. I’m able to embed some of the images here but for the list you will either have to click though the links or cut and then click on them :

Scandinavian Ghost Rockets / suspected impacts

Scandinavia Ghost Rocket reference map


Skyhook balloon

Balloon train

Balloon Radar reflectors

Theodolite instrument

Fu Go Balloons


Cold War Air Defense Map

Air Defense Radars 1948 /   Lashup Radar Network

Air Defense Identification Zones

Soviet Saucer speculation


A recent reply to one of my blog posts raised the question of “foreknowledge” of a plot against JFK and the idea that there was possible “collusion” by omission by senior government figures aware of a threat to President Kennedy but noting to act against it. That is certainly a complex question, worthy of a book or at least an extended research paper – neither of which I’m going to do myself. However I would offer the following observations related to foreknowledge at two different levels based on my own research and writing.

First, both the FBI and Secret Service were very much aware of real threats against JFK as of the fall of 1963. The FBI investigated source reports of verbal threats from its sources both within the ultra right (the Minutemen and the National States Rights Party) and from radicals within the anti-Castro Cuban exile community. The threats on the right were the most specific, including details on the formation of rifle teams and on the possibility of an attack in Washington, only week or so before the Texas trip a NSRP tip suggested a possible attack in Dallas. Of course by that time there were warnings about violence coming from virtually all quarters including Congresspersons and Dallas business leaders. The FBI provided warnings to the Secret Service about threats from those radical groups, we know of some of them related to both Chicago and Miami.

In turn the Secret Service did act against the Chicago threat, engaged with the CIA to act against threats in Miami and Tampa and with the Dallas Police to interdict an anticipated threat from violent right wing protests in Dallas (there were actually very special and extensive security preparations in Dallas, unfortunately centered on the planned speech at the Trade Center rather than the motorcade).

There were also very special actions taken in Miami, where threats of both IED type bombs and sniper attacks were known. Those actions involved the CIA’s local office, including its Cuban counter intelligence service led by Tony Sforza – a name which appears in Tipping Point. Certainly it would be fair to say that the CIA and specifically its Cuban operations group were ware of threats to the President and at least in some instances acted against them. They were also aware of violent threats from within exile groups they were working with. especially from the leaders within the CRC and within the military arm of the DRE.

Of course readers of Tipping Point will quickly realize that knowledge could have been a bad thing, if certain of those CIA officers decided to encourage those threats rather than act against them….and there is no real sign of the latter. That remains one very likely area of dangerous foreknowledge, but not at the highest levels of the agency, rather at the more dangerous operational levels.

The second, higher level, is much harder to deal with – particularly if you understand the convoluted and confusing process of political assassination I explored in NEXUS. Basically it was not at all uncommon for the highest senior officers in both the military and the intelligence community to talk about threats to national security and we can document that some of them viewed JFK’s policies on Laos, Vietnam and Cuba in that light.

Such remarks were certainly nothing new, I’ve written about that level of disagreement being so intense during the Eisenhower Administration that Ike explored legal action against several of his sitting and former Joint Chiefs, Truman had acted even more directly against such opposition. There is no lack of evidence for talk about “getting rid” of JFK, however that historically such talk was in the context of organizing political action to make sure he was not re-elected and that was becoming intense in 1963. Its hard to think that anyone participating in such talk would immediately jump to thoughts of a plot to kill him being in process.

Of course we know there was similar talk within the CIA, at the highest levels and down through CIA operations, most especially within Cuba related operations. But to know whether a particular individual was talking about politics or obstruction within the Administration (for example convincing Bundy or the Chiefs to be more hawkish directly with JFK or to challenge his decisions in regard to Vietnam or Cuba) or subtly suggesting something more violent is a good bit like retroactive mind reading.

That’s especially true given senior officer’s penchant for being nebulous in their remarks and seeking deniablity at all times. I’ve documented more than one occasion where the word “eliminate”, used in a political action sense, was incorrectly translated down the line of command to “kill”. A very dangerous situation indeed.

So….was there foreknowledge of threats, absolutely, was there action against certain of them…yes. Was there foreknowledge of the specific plot I describe in Tipping Point at senior levels, I doubt it.

However those same senior levels within the CIA were indeed aware of a threat to JFK from within the Cuban exile radical community – from their own sources and indeed from a very public warning by Fidel Castro himself. And there is no sign at all they acted against that threat.

Because of that I would agree there was a certain level of collusion though non-action, but I would put it specifically within the CIA, which can be shown to have been either unable or unwilling to prevent foreign political assassinations by its surrogates on more than one occasion, even with advance warnings. In this instance it was a domestic political assassination.

Puzzled and Perplexed

Its not an unknown state of mind in regard to the JFK assassination; I’ve been there many times over the last thirty plus years of delving into it. What has led me back into it at the moment is the response to Tipping Point.

Given that it was serialized online for over three months and now has been out in print for some time, I would have expected more questions than I’ve received – especially given that it introduced a number of new names into the equation, proposed a set of specific activities involving the CIA’s SAS group and JMWAVE’s activities in and around Lee Oswald in the fall of 1963 and got pretty specific about the actual conspiracy and the attack in Dallas. Its the furthest out on the conspiracy limb I’ve gone and usually when you do that the results are pretty predictable.

While there have been a few good questions about the new names and connections introduced in the book, I would have expected more given that the associations are quite complex and evolved significantly over a number of years – especially among those I’ve designated as actual participants. In other words, when you add that much history you expect it to be challenging for readers and I have no claim to have simplified matters to the point of being crystal clear in my writing.

Beyond that, in Someone Would Have Talked I closed a number of chapters with suggestions as to very specific pieces of research I thought would move matters forward. Somewhat surprisingly in many instances those leads did prove out and new research produced material that appeared in both NEXUS and finally in Tipping Point. However following Tipping Point I’ve hit a bit of a wall and am not sure what specific new research is viable in terms of moving further – not that there are not lots of open questions and leads, but with close to sixty years having past I’m not sure which of them are viable or that I should recommend. On the other hand, if some of you have decided to pursue certain leads I’d love to hear about it and any progress you have going forward.

So in pursuit of both issues – outstanding questions and new research directions, I’m soliciting questions that remain in reader’s minds or specific leads they think have potential in terms of the people and historical material still available. For reference those could come out of any of the major sections of Tipping Point:

Realty Check

The Cuba Backstory

Enter Lee Oswald

People in Motion

Context for Conspiracy

The Conspiracy / Operating in Dallas

Feel free to either post your thoughts on this thread or email me direct (which may be best given that provides more room for extended discussion) at