Political Assassination tracks

One of the perennial questions in regard to the JFK assassination – at least in regard to any involvement of the CIA or its personnel – has always revolved around the origins of political assassination within the Agency. Somewhat amazingly, after the work of the Church Committee and decades of research we really have a great deal of information and examples of how the actual history of political assassination. I incorporated a much of that in NEXUS, including the fact that there were always two tracks . One track being top down, with remarks normally originating in NSC meetings and in some instances directly from the sitting President.

We can now even appreciate the word games played inside that track, Eisenhower (used to giving commands) was quite direct stating in one meeting that “Lemumba must be eliminated”. Later, attendees in the meeting admitted that they interpreted that as an order actually kill Leumuba”. In another example President Clinton specifically issued a “kill order” on Osama Bin Laden, as an outstanding threat to American national security.

More generally, the standard word games found at the upper levels of American government have been much more discrete, offering all involved a path to denial if that should turn out to be needed. Richard Nixon was normally quite cautious about his language and more recently Donald Trump, with decades of business practice experience, appears to have substantially raised the bar on nebulous wording – a skill which can leave CIA Directors and even Attorney Generals in uncomfortable positions:

https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2021/06/11/william-barr-answer-revisited-lead-vpx.cnn

Still, whatever the wording, for matters to proceed a senior official, had to interpret his boss’s orders and begin a project to carry them out. And that process involves people, monies and communications – all of which do leave a trail. In the instance of Lemumba, CIA Director brought his Richard Bissell into action (Bissell having already been associated with such activities). In turn Bissell reached down to Staff D, was rejected by one officer but ultimately launched two separate efforts against Lemumba, one (poison) involving Sydney Gottlieb and technical services and the other using his Africa Division chief and the head of the field station in the Congo (kidnapping, murder contracts and other similar devices being put on the table though them). All of which we can now find in the communications and activities records.

In another effort during that era Bissell also became involved with the murder of Fidel Castro, again with separate tracks, one including poison and the other ambushes and rifle attacks. Yet again, money and assets were involved as well as operational activities and we have records of those as well (although only have only become available decades later).

History shows us that top down operations do leave tracks, however nebulous the remarks that put them in progress. This is all something discussed at length in a recent dialog I had with Chuck Ochelli concerning my work in NEXUS. However the other thing that came out, probably more clearly than I had written it or perhaps even discussed it was the nature of the “bottoms” up assassination track within the CIA. You can listed to the interview with Chuck at:

Hancock Collection Assassination Nexus

What is most important to understand is that there was a separate track which involved CIA officers, if not senior personnel, in assassinations. That track involved the surrogates being used in various operations, and began at the case officer and field officer level. In NEXUS I wrote abut it first in Iran and then in Guatemala, with proposals by the locals (revolutionaries, ex-patriots, etc) that the CIA was working with on regime change projects.

As it turns out those individuals, being at risk themselves, very often see political assassination as the quickest route to regime change, the victory of their movements and their own success – quickest, less costly, low profile and easiest to organize. Especially if the CIA officers they are working with can be convinced to continue the financial, weapons and other related support that they can use in such efforts.

It seems CIA case officers themselves sometimes endorsed such views; I give numerous examples in NEXUS and in my more recent book IN Denial as well. In some instances approval was given verbally, with a head nod, and the support required could not be distinguished from the activities already in process with those surrogates. In other instances it was a bit more obvious – as when the trainers (mudslinging David Morales) provided an actual manual on how to conducted assassinations as part of their support for the Guatemala project.

I’ll provide some further examples of the Track 2 (upwards) (which was never “sanctioned” in the manner of Track 1 (downwards) in a follow-on post – and get into an examination the the CIA activities of 1963 which might give us an insight into which might well have been in play in regard to the murder of President Kennedy.

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